

Message Text

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 CAPE T 00752 01 OF 03 141753Z
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /026 W
-----016529 141804Z /43
O 141706Z APR 78 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY CAPE TOWN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7108
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM NIACT IMMEDIATE
INFO AMEMBASSY BONNIMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY GABORONE IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY LAGOS IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY LONDTN IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY LUSAKA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY PRETORIA IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 3 CAPE TOWN 752

EXDIS

DAR ES SALAAM ALSO FOR USDEL SECRETARY

E.O. 11652: XGDS
TAGS: PDEV, RH, WA, SF
SUBJ: RHODESIA, NAMIBIA AND SOUTH AFRICA

IN LIGHT OF THE MALTA II MEETING WITH THE
PATRIOTIC FRONT AND THE SUBSEQUENT TALKS IN PRETORIA AND

SALISBURY, THE FOLLOWING ASSESSMENT OF THE POSITIONS OF THE
VARIOUS PARTIES ON THE RHODESIAN AND NAMIBIAN ISSUES -- AS
SEEN FROM HERE -- MAY BE OF USE.

I. RHODESIA

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 CAPE T 00752 01 OF 03 141753Z

A. THE VIEW FROM SALISBURY

1. S AMBASSADOR LOW SUGGESTS (PRETORIA 2049),
THE SALISBURY BLACKS, HAVING GAINED A POSITION OF APPARENT
AUTHORITY, ARE NOT ABOUT TO PUT THAT POSITION AT RISK -- AT
LEAST NOT AT THIS EARLY STAGE OF THE INTERIM REGIME.
THE SALISBURY GROUP SEEMS TO RECOGNIZE THAT ITS PROSPECTS

FOR ENHANCING ITS BARGAINING POSITION, GAINING INTERNATIONAL ACCEPTANCE, AND POSSIBLY ENTICING NKOMO INTO COOPERATION WITH IT WILL DEPEND UPON THE EXTENT TO WHICH IT ACHIEVES THREE PRIMARY GOALS:

- PROGRESS TOWARD ONE MAN ONE VOTE ELECTIONS AND MAJORITY RULE BY THE END OF THE YEAR,
- MAINTENANCE OF UNIT WITHIN THE TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT, AND
- IMPROVEMENT IN THE SECURITY SITUATION, OR AT LEAST A HOLDING OF THE LINE.

2. THE "SALISBURY TALKERS", AS CALLAGHAN REFERRED TO THEM, SEEM TO ANTICIPATE THAT MILITARY AND POLITICAL PRESSURES AGAINST THE INTERNAL SETTLEMENT WILL PROBABLY ESCALATE FOR A TIME, BUT AS THE TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT MOVES AHEAD, AND AS THEY HOPE FOR DEFECTIONS FROM THE PATRIOTIC FRONT MILITARY FORCES TAKE PLACE, THEY BELIEVE THESE PRESSURES WILL DECREASE.

3. AN ALL-PARTIES CONFERENCE POSES A DANGER TO THE SALISBURY GROUP AS IT COULD SUGGEST WEAKNESS AND RESULT IN A LOSS OF MOMENTUM TO THE INTERNAL SETTLEMENT AND A BLOW TO MORALE. FURTHERMORE, THE LEADERS IN SALISBURY MAY HAVE FORESEEN THE POSSIBILITY OF THE PF COMING CLOSE TO OR ACTUALLY ACCEPTING THE AAP AT MALTA II, AND IN THIS SITUATION, THEY WOULD HAVE CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 CAPE T 00752 01 OF 03 141753Z

LITTLE LEEWAY TO BARGAIN FOR A COMPROMISE SIGNIFICANTLY DIFFERENT FROM THE AAP.

B. THE PATRIOTIC FRONT PERSPECTIVE

1. THE PF LEADERS COULD WELL VIEW THE SITUATION CONFRONTING IT ALONG THE FOLLOWING LINES:

- THE BLACK SALISBURY TALKERS BURNED A NUMBER OF BRIDGES BY SWEARING ALLEGIANCE TO THE SMITH REGIME.
- BY JOINING SMITH IN REJECTING THE ALL-PARTIES CONFERENCE, THEY CLOSED YET ANOTHER AVENUE OF POSSIBLE RETREAT AND DEMONSTRATED DETERMINATION TO GO THEIR OWN WAY.
- THUS, ANY LIKELIHOOD THAT MUZOREWA OR SITHOLE MIGHT ACCEPT SOMETHING LIKE THE AAP TRANSITION ARRANGEMENTS AND A NEW ZIMBABWE ARMY BASED ON THE LIBERATION FORCES HAS FADED EVEN FURTHER.
- A BASIC CHANGE IN THE PRESENT STANCE OF THE SALISBURY BLACK LEADERS WOULD LIKELY OCCUR ONLY IN THE EVENT OF A BREAKUP OF THE INTERIM REGIME, A DRAMATIC WORSENING IN THE MILITARY PICTURE, OR SERIOUS PRESSURE FROM SOUTH AFRICA.

-- IF ANY OF THESE SITUATIONS AROSE AND MUZOREWA AND SITHOLE WERE TO ALTER THEIR POSITION, THEIR IMAGE AND BARGAINING POSITION WOULD BE SEVERELY UNDERMINED AND THE WHITE REGIME WOULD BE DEMORALIZED. IN THIS CIRCUMSTANCE, THE PF COULD DRIVE A HARDER BARGAIN THAN THE TERMS OF THE AAP.

2. GIVEN THESE ASSUMPTIONS, THE PF AND ITS FRONT LINE ALLIES CAN BE EXPECTED TO USE MALTA II TO TIE US MORE CLOSELY TO THE AAP. THEIR OBJECTIVE, UNLESS US-UK AGREEMENT TO NEW SANCTIONS COULD BE OBTAINED, WOULD BE TO CREATE A DEGREE OF US-UK COMMITMENT TO THE AAP WHICH WOULD HEAD OFF CREEPING ACQUIESCENCE IN THE SALISBURY AGREEMENT AND MAKE EVEN LESS FEASIBLE
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 CAPE T 00752 01 OF 03 141753Z

WESTERN SUPPORT OF SALISBURY IN THE EVENT OF ESCALATED WARFARE WHICH CONCEIVABLY COULD INVOLVE GREATER SOVIET ASSISTANCE TO THE PF. ESCALATION OF THE WAR IS TO BE EXPECTED IF, AS WE SUSPECT IS LIKELY, THE PF CALCULATES DIPLOMACY WILL NOT DISLodge THE SALISBURY AGREEMENT..

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 CAPE T 00752 02 OF 03 141806Z
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /026 W
-----016713 141809Z /43

O 141706Z APR 78 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY CAPE TOWN
TO RUXUCRMSECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7109
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM NIACT IMMEDIATE
INFO AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY GABORONE IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY LAGOS IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY LUSAKA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY PRETORIA IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 3 CAPE TOWN 752

EXDIS

DAR ES SALAAM ALSO FOR USDEL SECRETARY

C. AN IMPASSE

1. IN LIGHT OF THE DYNAMICS DESCRIBED ABOVE, THE ODDS ARE FAIRLY HIGH THAT THE IMPASSE OVER A NEGOTIATED INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENT WILL CONTINUE WHETHER THE PF ACCEPTS THE AAP OR NOT. IN DECIDING ON OUR COURSE IN SUCH A SITUATION, A MAJOR CONSIDERATION IS THE UNCERTAINTY NOT ONLY ABOUT THE VIABILITY OF THE INTERNAL SETTLEMENT BUT ALSO ABOUT THE COHESIVENESS AND FUTURE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE PF. THE NKOMO-MUGABE IMBROGLIO OVER THE DATE AND LOCALE OF MALTA II IS ONLY THE MOST RECENT REFLECTION OF THE PERSISTENT DIVISIONS BETWEEN ZAPU AND ZANU. IF THE NEGOTIATING IMPASSE CONTINUES, BOTH THE INTERIM REGIMA AND THE PF WILL BE TESTED OVER THE NEXT FEW MONTHS, AND WE MAY WANT TO CONSIDER IN THIS CASE
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 CAPE T 00752 02 OF 03 141806Z

LETTING THE RELATIVE STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF BOTH PARTIES CLARIFY BEFORE RECONSIDERING OUR DIPLOMATIC STRATEGY.

D. THE SOUTH AFRICAN FACTOR

1. THE SAG HAS WELCOMED THE SALISBURY AGREEMENT AND FAVORS GIVING IT A CHANCE TO SUCCEED. THE SOUTH AFRICANS HAVE REPEATEDLY ASSERTED THAT THEY WILL NEVER BRING PRESSURE ON SMITH. STILL, THE SAG HAS KEPT A RELATIVELY LOW POSTURE ON THE SUBJECT AND IT IS WELL AWARE OF THE POSSIBILITY OF AN ESCALATION OF THE FIGHTING, POSSIBLY WITH MORE SOVIET/CUBAN INVOLVEMENT.

2. THE WORSE-CASE SCENARIO FOR RHODESIA, IF IT EVENTUATES, WOULD THREATEN TO OFFSET THE BROAD GAINS SOUTH AFRICA WOULD HOPE TO REAP AS THE RESULT OF AN INTERNATIONALLY ACCEPTABLE AGREEMENT ON NAMIBIA--ENDING A COSTLY SOUTH AFRICAN INVOLVEMENT, ELIMINATING AN OPPORTUNITY FOR FURTHER SOVIET/CUBAN ADVENTURES IN SOUTHERN AFRICA, AND WINNING DIPLOMATIC CREDIT IN THE WORLD ARENA, ESPECIALLY IN THE WEST AND POSSIBLY EVEN IN AFRICA.

3. ASSUMING THERE CONTINUE TO BE SIGNS OF POSITIVE MOVEMENT BY THE SAG ON NAMIBIA (SEE BELOW), THERE WILL BE A RESTRAINT ON OUR APPROACH TO SOUTH AFRICA ON RHODESIA. WE WILL PROBABLY FIND THE SOUTH AFRICANS CONSIDERABLY MORE SKEPTICAL ABOUT THE AAP THAN IT HAS BEEN ABOUT THE WESTERN PROPOSAL ON NAMIBIA. THEY HAVE BEEN PARTICULARLY CRITICAL OF THE PROVISION TO BASE THE ZIMBABWE NATIONAL ARMY ON THE LIBERATION FORCES. CONCEIVABLY, THE SAG MIGHT URGE US TO STRUCTURE A

RHODESIAN AGREEMENT MORE ALONG THE LINES OF THE NAMIBIAN PROPOSAL. THE SAG MIGHT AGREE TO ENCOURAGE SALISBURY TO ATTEND THE ALL-PARTIES CONFERENCE, BUT IT IS DOUBTFUL THAT THEY WILL CONSIDER ANYTHING BEYOND THAT AT THIS TIME.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 CAPE T 00752 02 OF 03 141806Z

II. NAMIBIA

1. THOUGH THE SIGNALS CONTINUE TO BE MIXED, THERE ARE SOME ENCOURAGING SIGNS THAT THE SAG MAY BE MOVING TOWARD BASIC ACCEPTANCE OF THE WESTERN PROPOSAL ON NAMIBIA (CAPE TOWN 745, 746). IN THE BACKGROUND IS THE SAG'S GROWING CONCERN WITH ITS ISOLATION. DESPITE THE BRAVADO AND CLAIMS OF SELF-SUFFICIENCY, THERE DOES SEEM TO BE AN INCREASING AWARENESS HERE THAT THE HARDENING WESTERN POSITION TOWARD SOUTH AFRICA IS NOT JUST A TRANSIENT PHENOMENUM RELATED TO THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION.

2. IT WOULD BE APPROPRIATE TO PROCEED ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT BOTHA IS IN FACT WORKING FOR SAG ACCEPTANCE OF THE PROPOSAL ON NAMIBIA AND ATTEMPT TO SUPPORT HIM IN THIS. WE WOULD SERVE THIS OBJECTIVE BY ACCENTUATING NOT ONLY THE REALITIES AS WE SEE THEM BUT BY RESPONDING AS POSITIVELY AS POSSIBLE ON POINTS ABOUT WHICH BOTHA WILL SEEK ADDITIONAL CLARIFICATIONS OR ASSURANCES.

3. ON SABC-TV LAST NIGHT (APRIL 13), BOTHA REFERRED TO THE DTA DELEGATION'S REQUEST FOR FURTHER CLARIFICATIONS (CAPE TOWN 745) AND SAID HE WOULD RAISE THESE WITH THE SECRETARY AND OWEN. BASED ON THE POINTS RAISED YESTERDAY BY THE PRIME MINISTER IN PARLIAMENT (AND REPEATED BY HIM ON SABC-TV LAST NIGHT) AND QUESTIONS POSED BY THE DTA DELEGATION IN ITS PRIVATE SESSIONS YESTERDAY AS WELL AS BY PAST SAG POSITIONS, BOTHA IN THE PRETORIA TALKS IS LIKELY TO CONCENTRATE ON GAINING WESTERN COMMITMENTS TO GUARANTEE THE PROPOSAL. HE MAY ASK IF THE WEST IS PREPARED TO GUARANTEE AGAINST MILITARY INTERVENTION DURING THE TRANSITION PERIOD AND WHETHER IT WILL SUPPORT THE INTEGRITY AND SECURITY OF ANY INDEPENDENT STATE THAT EMERGES FROM THE PROCESS, INCLUDING A DTA-DOMINATED ONE. BOTHA MAY ALSO ASK WHAT WILL HAPPEN IF SOUTH AFRICA ACCEPTS THE PROPOSAL BUT SWAPO PATENTLY VIOLATES THE AGREEMENT DURING THE TRANSITION PERIOD OR INDEED SWAPO REFUSES TO GO ALONG WITH THE SETTLEMENT AT ALL. HE MAY ALSO ASK FOR ASSURANCES ABOUT THE IMPARTIALITY

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 CAPE T 00752 02 OF 03 141806Z

OF THE UNSR AND WESTERN INVOLVEMENT IN THE RESOLUTION OF

ANY DISAGREEMENTS BETWEEN THE A-G AND THE UNSR. IN ADDITION, HE MAY SEEK A WESTERN COMMITMENT TO ASSURE THE RELIABILITY OF PROCEDURES PROVIDING AN OPPORTUNITY FOR ALL NAMIBIANS DETAINED ABROAD TO RETURN.

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 CAPE T 00752 03 OF 03 141814Z
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /026 W
-----016809 141817Z /43

O 141706Z APR 78 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY CAPE TOWN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7110
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM NIACT IMMEDIATE
INFO AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY GABORONE IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY LAGOS IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY LUSAKA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY PRETORIA IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 3 OF 3 CAPE TOWN 752

EXDIS

DAR ES SALAAM ALSO FOR USDEL SECRETARY

4. A MAJOR SPECIFIC POINT BOTH MAY WELL PURSUE IS THE QUESTION OF THE AUTHORITY OF THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY TO REQUEST SAG FORCES TO REMAIN. FOURIE INDICATED TO ME TODAY THAT ONE WAY OF HANDLING THIS WOULD BE FOR THE SAG TO MAKE A PUBLIC STATEMENT ON THIS POINT. ONE APPROACH FOR US WOULD BE TO REITERATE THAT THE ASSEMBLY COULD STATE ITS VIEWS ON THIS ISSUE.

WE HAVE, OF COURSE, CONFIRMED THAT INDEPENDENT NAMIBIA COULD, IF IT DESIRED, INVITE SAG FORCES INTO THE COUNTRY.

5. AT THE PRETORIA MEETING WE MAY ALSO GET SOME INDICATION THAT THE SAG WILL ATTACH AS A CONDITION TO ITS
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 CAPE T 00752 03 OF 03 141814Z

ACCEPTANCE OF THE PROPOSAL A PROVISIO THAT A TARGET DATE FOR ELECTIONS BE SET PENDING CONSULTATION WITH THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE. THE DTA GROUP ATTACHES GREAT IMPORTANCE TO THIS AND BOTHA MAY ARGUE THAT A TARGET DATE IS NECESSARY TO PREVENT SWAPO DALLIANCE FROM MAKING ELECTIONS THIS YEAR IMPOSSIBLE AND DELAYING THE PROCEDURE UNTIL AFTER THE END OF THE NEXT RAINY SEASON (ABOUT THIS TIME NEXT YEAR.) WE SHOULD CERTAINLY DISCOURAGE THIS IDEA BECAUSE OF ITS IMPACT ON SWAPO AND THE BLACK AFRICAN STATES.

III. SOUTH AFRICA -- THE LINK

1. VORSTER APPEARS INTERESTED IN DISCUSSING A TRADE-OFF IN WHICH HE WOULD COOPERATE MORE DECISIVELY IN INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS OF SOUTHERN AFRICAN PROBLEMS, INCLUDING THE NUCLEAR ISSUE, IN RETURN FOR A US COMMITMENT TO A MORE BENIGN POSTURE TOWARD THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT. VORSTER IMPLIED SUCH A TRADE-OFF IN REGARD TO THE NUCLEAR ISSUE IN HIS LETTER TO PRESIDENT CARTER OF OCT. 12, 1977, A POSITION WHICH WAS REITERATED IN THE SAG'S LATEST RESPONSE TO OUR PROPOSALS ON THIS ISSUE. BOTHA MIGHT POSSIBLY BROACH THIS SUBJECT BY COMPLAINING OF CONTINUED WESTERN "MEDDLING" IN SOUTH AFRICA'S DOMESTIC AFFAIRS WHILE EXPECTING SAG COOPERATION ON OTHER MAJOR ISSUES. IN RESPONSE, WE MIGHT REITERATE THE BASIC SEPARATION OF THESE ISSUES IN OUR VIEW BUT EMPHASIZE THAT SAG COOPERATION IN BRINGING ABOUT PEACEFUL AND DEMOCRATIC TRANSITIONS TO MAJORITY RULE IN NAMIBIA AND RHODESIA (AS WELL AS AGREEMENT ON THE NUCLEAR ISSUE) IS BOUND TO HAVE A MAJOR IMPACT ON THE CREDIBILITY OF THE SAG, INCLUDING ITS STATED INTENTION TO MOVE TOWARD A MORE EQUITABLE SOCIETY AT HOME. WE MIGHT ASSERT THAT THIS

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 CAPE T 00752 03 OF 03 141814Z

WILL HAVE A FAVORABLE EFFECT ON WESTERN RELATIONS WITH SOUTH AFRICA, BUT THE SAG HAS COMPELLING SELF-INTERESTS IN SUCCESSFUL RESOLUTIONS OF THE NAMIBIAN, RHODESIAN AND NUCLEAR ISSUES AND ITS DECISIONS ON THESE QUESTIONS WILL HAVE TO BE MADE FUNDAMENTALLY ON THIS BASIS.

BOWDLER

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: Z
Capture Date: 01 jan 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: BRIEFING MATERIALS, FOREIGN POLICY POSITION, MALTA II
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 14 apr 1978
Decaption Date: 20 Mar 2014
Decaption Note: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 20 Mar 2014
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1978CAPET00752
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: DOWNGRADE PER 78 CAPE TOWN 784 DTD 4/20/78
Executive Order: X3
Errors: N/A
Expiration:
Film Number: D780161-0246
Format: TEL
From: CAPE TOWN
Handling Restrictions:
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1978/newtext/t19780456/aaaabvar.tel
Line Count: 382
Litigation Code IDs:
Litigation Codes:
Litigation History:
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Message ID: a9a501b0-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Office: ACTION SS
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Original Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 7
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Previous Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Reference: n/a
Retention: 0
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 01 may 2005
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review Media Identifier:
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
SAS ID: 2965283
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: RHODESIA, NAMIBIA AND SOUTH AFRICA IN LIGHT OF THE MALTA II MEETING WITH THE PATRIOTIC FRONT AND THE SUBSEQUENT TALKS IN PRETOR
TAGS: PDEV, RH, WA, SF
To: STATE USUN NEW YORK
Type: TE
vdkgvwkey: odb://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_Docs/a9a501b0-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Review Markings:
Sheryl P. Walter
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
20 Mar 2014
Markings: Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014